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PERSONS IN A COMATOSE OR VEGETATIVE STATE:
INCLUDING THEM AS MENTALLY INCAPACITATED
PERSONS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH ORDINANCE
0
Athena Liu*
The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong's report, released in August 2006,
on Substitute Decision-Making and Advance Directives in Relation to Medical
Treatment recommends, inter alia, that the definition of a "mentally incapacitated
person" in the Mental Health Ordinance be expanded to include persons who
are in a coma or vegetative state. This paper examines some of the issues which
the Report considers as the basis for this recommendation and the problems
associated with the recommendation. The author argues that although the Report
addresses some key concerns, it omits other important considerations. The author
concludes with a suggestion that the issue of decision making in relation to medical
treatment, and other related issues, be examined again in the near future.
Introduction
In August 2006, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong released a
report on Substitute Decision-Making and Advance Directives in Rela-
tion to Medical Treatment ("the Report").' The Report addresses the issue
of "decision-making for persons who are unable to make those decisions at
the time of execution of the associated action".2 One dimension which the
Report focuses on is proxy decision making. According to the Report, what
needs to be considered are the issue relating to:
"decisions made by a third party in respect of the medical treatment and
the management of property and affairs of persons who are comatose or in
a vegetative state."3
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1 http://www.hkreform.gov.hk (August 2006). This was preceded by the Law Reform Commission
of Hong Kong Consultation Paper on Substitute Decision-Making and Advance Directives in
Relation to Medical Treatment (http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/rdecision.htm) (July
2004).
2 The Report, Preface, para 3.
Ibid, emphasis added.
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The Report recommends, inter alia, that the definition of a "mentally in-
capacitated person" (MIP) in the Mental Health Ordinance (MHO) be
expanded to include persons who are in a coma or vegetative state.4
In this article, the term "adult lacking capacity" refers to one who can-
not make decisions required to be made, "mentally incapacitated person"
is used only in the context of the MHO because it is a statutorily defined
term, and the terms "decision making" or "proxy decision making" refer
only to medical decisions, and not to decisions relating to the management of
property and affairs.' The reason for this distinction is that the Report is en-
titled "...Decision-Making... in Relation to Medical Treatment"; decision
making concerning the management of property and affairs, as a result, is
strictly beyond its scope.
This article is divided into four parts. First, it outlines - what the Report
acknowledges as important - the law governing decision making in view of
Hong Kong's aging population. The author comments, however, that the
Report does not go into sufficient depth in considering the legal difficul-
ties associated with decision making in respect of medical treatment of the
elderly, and that it instead focuses on a sub-group of adults lacking capacity,
ie those in a coma or vegetative state. Part 2 examines the common law
principles governing medical treatment for adults lacking capacity. In Part
3 the author identifies the inadequacies of the common law: primarily, that
there is no possibility of proxy decision making by a relative or guardian
(Part VIC of the MHO currently provides a statutory mechanism for proxy
decision making, but the current definition of a MIP in the MHO does not
cover those who are in a coma or vegetative state). Part 4 examines the Re-
port's recommendation that the definition of a MIP be expanded to include
those patients who are in a coma or vegetative state, thereby allowing proxy
decision making in such cases. The paper concludes with an examination of
the problems associated with this recommendation.
The author submits that the Report has made an excellent start, but that
it omits some important considerations. The author, therefore recommends
that decision making in relation to medical treatment, and other related is-
sues, be examined again in the near future.
Recommendations 10 and 11; see also lan Stoker, "Substitute Decision-Making and Advance Di-
rectives in Relation to Medical Treatment" (2006) Hong Kong Lawyer 26-28.
Paragraph 3 (quoted above), emphasis added. The phrase "property and affairs" in Part II of the
MHO does not extend to making decisions regarding medical treatment. Medical decisions are per-
sonal in nature and do not relate to "property and affairs", see Re W [1970] 1 All ER 502. See also
Peter Bartlett and Ralph Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice (London: Blackstone
Press Limited, 2000), p 399.
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1. Decision Making and Hong Kong's Aging Population
The Report begins with the legal importance of decision making:
"Making decisions is an important part of life. It empowers people by al-
lowing them to express their individuality. It enables people to control
their lives and gives them a sense of self-respect and dignity. However,
for some decisions to be legally effective, it is necessary that the person
making the decision has a certain level of understanding. The reason for
this is very simple: it is to protect against abuse or exploitation of a per-
son who may be made vulnerable by impaired decision-making capacity.
It also helps other people who may be affected by a decision to know
where they stand."'
The Report presents the context in which decision making is likely to be of
increasing importance, particularly in light of Hong Kong's changing demo-
graphics. The Report says:
"In line with global trends, Hong Kong's population is rapidly aging. The
1999 report noted that the number of those aged 65 or above in 1981
was 334,000, and this elderly population had increased to 690,000 by
1998. This figure was said to represent 11% of the total population... The
1999 report also projected that by 2016, the number of elderly persons
in the population would reach 1,080,000, amounting to about 13% of
the total population."7
The rapidly aging population will exert an enormous pressure on social
and healthcare services, for example a growing demand for various forms of
elderly care.8 Furthermore, a question of increasing importance is: who is
legally authorised to make decisions for those who are incapable of doing so
themselves? As the Report says:
"The legal problems that stem from health care and medical treatment
of the elderly will inevitably arise, particularly when they are, or are be-
coming, mentally incapacitated by reason of illness or physical injury."9
6 Paragraph 1.
Paragraph 1.10.
Chu and Chi, "Long-term care and hospital care for the elderly" in Leung and Bacon-Shone (eds)
Hong Kong Health System: Reflections, Perspectives and Visions (Hong Kong University Press, 2006),
pp 223-252.
Paragraph 1.12.
Vol 3 7 Part 3
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One problem of particular concern is dementia. Available statistics indicate
that the incidence of dementia is five to 10 per cent in persons over 65, and
20 per cent in persons over 80.10 Some patients have been shown to survive
up to 15 years from the point of diagnosis with the average survival being
eight to 10 years. As the Report notes:
"the typical clinical course in dementia is progressive decline in mental
and physical functions, leading to total dependence on others and re-
quiring multiple levels of services.""
In view of the above, one possible option for handling the need for deci-
sion-making of an elderly person suffering from a progressively degenerative
disease (such as dementia) is proxy decision making.
Although the Report commences with a discussion on the elderly, it
does not contain much analysis on the legal problems associated with the
decision-making process of, or proxy decision making for, the elderly. This
is because the Report narrows its focus on a sub-group of adults lacking
capacity, that is, those who are in a coma or vegetative state (even though
this sub-group is not generally associated with the elderly). It is unclear in
the Report why this focus is adopted. The Report also does not provide an
estimated population of this sub-group in Hong Kong. It is submitted that
the legal problems of those in a coma or vegetative state overlap in many
respects with those of demented elderly persons lacking decision making
capacity, yet such a narrow focus appears to reduce the importance of the
Report's recommendations.13 Nonetheless the Report thoroughly outlines
the general principles governing adults lacking capacity.
2. The Common Law Governing Medical Treatment for Adults Lacking
Capacity
The Report outlines the common law position in Chapter 4 "Mentally in-
capacitated persons: the common law and consent to medical treatment".
It correctly summarises, inter alia, the principles of consent, self-determina-
tion, sanctity of life (and where a patient is competent, sanctity of life must
'o Paragraph 1.6.
" Paragraph 1.7.
12 The Report notes that the cause of coma is usually unrelated to aging. It states that coma "is usual-
ly as the result of a head injury, neurological disease, acute hydrocephaly, intoxication or metabolic
derangement", see para 6.8.
1 In Part 4 of this article, it is submitted however that the impact of the Report's recommendation is
actually much wider.
(2007) HKLJ
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yield to self-determination) and the doctrine of necessity." These principles
will be restated only if they are relevant here.
2.1 Right to self-determination of a competent adult
A general common law principle is that medical treatment of a competent
adult is unlawful unless it is given with that person's valid consent.
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault ...".5
The rationale for this is that a competent adult has the right to self-deter-
mination, and may refuse beneficial treatment. Effectively, what may be
considered as a medical benefit may not be imposed on a person without his
or her consent.
2.2 No proxy consent
In the case where an adult has been rendered unconscious in a traffic ac-
cident, it is reasonable to think that a relative's consent would be required
before treatment could lawfully proceed. Contrary to common belief, the
common law does not recognise proxy consent for medical treatment in
such cases. The practice of seeking the consent of a relative prior to treat-
ment in such circumstances is a misconception, as a relative has no legal
right either to consent or to refuse. In fact, no one has such a right. In Re T
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment),16 Lord Donaldson said:
"There seems to be a view in the medical profession that in ... emergen-
cy circumstances, the next of kin should be asked to consent on behalf
of the patient and that, if possible, treatment should be postponed until
that consent has been obtained. This is a misconception because the
next of kin has no legal right whether to consent or to refuse consent."
2.3 Doctrine of necessity: treatment for the best interests of adults lacking
capacity
The common law governing the lawfulness of a treatment given to an
incapacitated adult (for instance, an adult who has been rendered uncon-
scious in a traffic accident) was considered by the English House of Lords'
14 Paragraph 4.49.
15 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125.
6 [1992] 4 All ER 649 at p 653.
Vol 3 7 Part 3
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decision in 1989 in Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)17 (hereafter Re F).
In Re F, the House of Lords was confronted with F, a 36-year-old sexually
active mentally disabled woman with the verbal capacity of a two-year-
old. Medical evidence suggested that she would be unable to cope with
pregnancy, delivery and childbirth. All contraceptive methods, other than
sterilisation, were thought to be inappropriate. As a consequence, sterilisa-
tion was considered to be in her best interests but she was unable to give a
valid consent. The patient's mother sought a judicial declaration that the
proposed sterilisation should be lawful despite F's inability to give a valid
consent.
It was held that a doctor may lawfully treat such a patient without
consent if the treatment is in the best interests of the patient. A treat-
ment is deemed to be in the best interests of a patient if it saves a life, or
if it ensures improvement or prevents deterioration in a patient's physical
or mental health. Further, whether a treatment is in the best interests of a
patient depends on what is accepted as appropriate by a responsible body
of medical opinion in that particular treatment. It follows, therefore, that
the legality of treatment given to an incapacitated patient is not premised
on the court's approval, and that medical care can be delivered efficiently
without delay.
2.4 Judicial declaration as a means of protecting adults lacking capacity
The Report notes that Re F confers on doctors the power over the inca-
pacitated patients on the basis of "doctor knows best"." It also notes the
usefulness of judicial declaration.19 However, it does not consider how the
common law has adapted itself for the protection of adults lacking capacity
who are vulnerable under this "doctor knows best" approach, especially in
the context of some controversial and irreversible decisions (for instance,
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment of a person who is in a coma or
vegetative state).zo
The protective mechanism introduced by the House of Lords in Re F
was that non-therapeutic sterilisation of an incapacitated person should be
placed in a special category. This means that, as a matter of good practice,
although not strictly necessary, such an operation should be brought before
the court for an independent, objective and authoritative review on the
lawfulness of the procedure. 1 The decision in Re F is now reflected in Part
1 [1989] 2 All ER 545.
's Paragraph 6.29.
19 Paragraph 6.35.
2 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821.
z1 For developments since Re F, see Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical
and Welfare Decisions for Adults who Lack Capacity) [2001] 2 FLR 158.
(2007) HKLJ
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IVC of the MHO. Part IVC of the MHO provides a statutory mechanism
for proxy decision making; and it has made non-therapeutic sterilisation a
"special" treatment. This means that consent of a relative or guardian per se
would not render the operation lawful. Effectively, non-therapeutic sterili-
sation may only be performed with judicial consent.2
3. Problem Addressed by the Report: a Person in a Coma or Vegetative
State
The general principles mentioned above (in Re F) apply to all adults lack-
ing capacity irrespective of the reasons for their incapacity (ie whether it is
as a consequence of aging or from an accidental injury resulting in a coma
or vegetative state).
The Report focuses its attention on those who are comatose or in a veg-
etative state; both conditions that are usually unrelated to aging.
The Report defines these two terms in the context of a much larger med-
ical condition. This much larger medical condition is defined in the Report
in four stages (or medical condition): coma, vegetative state, continuing
vegetative state and permanent vegetative state. In layman's terms, they
represent a continuum of progressive irreversibility of a hopeless condition.
What is important to point out here is that, legally, a person in any of these
four states is not dead.13 The Report defines coma as follows:
"Coma is defined as a prolonged state of unconsciousness.. .When per-
sons experience a brain injury, they can lose consciousness. When the
unconscious state is prolonged, it is termed a 'coma'. A coma is a con-
tinued unconscious state that can occur as part of the natural recovery
for a person who has experienced a severe brain injury... Persons who
sustain a severe brain injury and experience coma can make significant
improvements, but are often left with permanent physical, cognitive or
behavioural impairments.. .The length of a coma cannot be accurately
predicted or known." 4
A vegetative state is defined as:
"A clinical condition of unawareness of self and environment in which
n Section 59ZG. See also Liu, "Consent to medical treatment for and by a mentally incapacitated
adult: the interplay between the Hong Kong common law and Part IVC of the Mental Health Or-
dinance (MHO)", Law Lectures for Practitioners (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005).
23 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821.
" Paragraph 1.14, emphasis added.
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the patient breathes spontaneously, has a stable circulation and shows
cycles of eye closure and eye opening which may simulate sleep and
waking. This may be a transient stage in the recovery from coma or it may
persist until death,"25
Unlike a person who is in a coma or vegetative state, a person who is in
a continuing vegetative state or permanent vegetative state means that
recovery is increasingly unlikely. A continuing vegetative state (CVS) is
defined as:
"When the vegetative state continues for more than four weeks it be-
comes increasingly unlikely that the condition is part of a recovery
phase from coma and the diagnosis of a continuing vegetative state can
be made." 26
A permanent vegetative state (PVS) is defined as:
"A patient in a continuing vegetative state will enter a permanent veg-
etative state when the diagnosis of irreversibility can be established with
a high degree of clinical certainty. It is a diagnosis which is not absolute
but based on probabilities. Nevertheless, it may reasonably be made
when a patient has been in a continuing vegetative state following head
injury for more than 12 months or following other causes of brain damage for
more than six months."n
In light of these definitions, one can see that the Report considers only the
position of those who are in the first two stages (ie those who are in a coma
or vegetative state); and it recommends that such patients be included
within the definition of a MIP in the MHO.
The reason for the Report's recommendation appears in Chapter 6, un-
der "Deficiencies in the Mental Health Ordinance". The Report notes that
the current definition of a MIP in the MHO is limited to those who are
mentally disordered and mentally handicapped." The MHO currently de-
fines "mental disorder" to mean:
Paragraph 1.15, emphasis added.
26 Paragraph 1.15, emphasis added.
2 Paragraph 1.15, emphasis added.
z8 Section 2 defines "mental handicap" to mean "sub-average general intellectual functioning with
deficiencies in adaptive behaviour". It further defines "sub-average general intellectual function-
ing" to mean "an IQ of 70 or below according to the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children or
an equivalent scale in a standardized intelligence test".
(2007) HKLJ
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"(a) mental illness;
(b) a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which
amounts to a significant impairment of intelligence and social func-
tioning which is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously
irresponsible conduct on the part of the person concerned;
(c) psychopathic disorder; or
(d) any other disorder or disability of mind which does not amount to
mental handicap."
The Report outlines the problem with the existing legislation:
"Clearly, a person in a coma or 'vegetative state' does not fall within
category (b) or (c) of the Cap 136 definition of 'mental disorder' as he
obviously cannot exhibit 'aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct.' It is
also doubtful that he would fall within category (a) of the definition as
the exact meaning of the term 'mental illness' is far from clear... Wheth-
er a 'vegetative' patient or a person in coma would fall within category
(d) ('any other disorder or disability of mind which does not amount to mental
handicap') is again unclear." 9
In short, those who are in a coma or vegetative state do not clearly fall
within the current legal definition of a MIP of the MHO.
To the uninitiated, the obvious question is: why should a person who
is in a coma or vegetative state be within the MHO? After all, the MHO
has often been associated with those who are mentally disordered or handi-
capped. Furthermore, as explained in Part 2 above, the decision making
process for these patients in relation to medical treatment is now governed
by the common law principles in Re F.
The Report considers the common law on this issue to be problematic.
It states that:
"The existing legal mechanisms are complicated, inflexible and piece-
meal. The establishment of the Guardianship Board under the Mental
Health Ordinance has made some improvements to the Ordinance in
promoting the welfare and care of the mentally incapacitated ..."
It is submitted that there are various reasons why the existing common law,
with no provision for proxy decision making, may be considered inadequate.
The first three relate to the doctrine of necessity (as outlined in Part 2 of
Paragraphs 6.6-6.7; see also para 6.21.
Paragraphs 6.44-6.46.
Vol 3 7 Part 3
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this article) and the last is cultural. First, it could be argued that the doc-
trine of necessity gives too much power to doctors to provide treatment in
what they consider to be in the best interest of the patients. Secondly, the
best interests of a patient as viewed by a doctor may differ from the view of
the patient's or the patient's family. Thirdly, the exact scope of the doctrine
of necessity may be uncertain (as can be seen in recent case law)." Fourthly
(and this may be the most important), Hong Kong is a predominantly Chi-
nese society which stresses family relationships. An adult lacking capacity
is often cared for and supported by family members. It therefore may ap-
pear odd, if not unreasonable, that family members cannot make decisions
for, and on behalf of, their dependant adult. Many may also argue that in
view of the relatively strong family ties, family members may actually know
what the patient would consider to be acceptable medical treatment. Con-
sequently, there is no reason why a doctor (who is likely to be a stranger to
the patient and the family) should decide.
In light of the reasons above, it is submitted that there is a clear need for
proxy decision making. The importance of proxy decision making is noted
by the Report, again in the context of the aging population. As the Report
states,
"The problem of proxy decisions is present almost daily and with an
aging population its incidence can be expected to increase. It may
therefore be necessary to put in place a mechanism which facilitates the
decision-making process and to ensure that this mechanism articulates
the rights and duties of those affected."32
Proxy decision making is currently not possible under common law. How-
ever, it is available under Part IVC of the MHO.33 One obvious solution
which can overcome the inadequacies of the common law is to expand the
definition of a MIP so that proxy decision making is made available to those
who are in a coma or vegetative state.
3 On the limits of the doctrine of necessity, see HL v United Kingdom (45508/99) (2005) 40 EHRR
32 (ECHR).
32 Paragraph 6.39.
33 The statutory provisions governing proxy decision making of an MIP can be found in Part IVB and
Part IVC of the MHO. Part IVB establishes the Guardianship Board. The Guardianship Board has
the power to appoint a guardian for an MIP, and the guardian may be given the power, inter alia,
to consent to treatment on behalf of an MIP. Part IVC stipulates the rules governing consent to
medical and dental treatment. It envisages two types of proxy consent, these are proxy consent to
treatment given by a guardian, and consent given by the court on behalf of a MIP. Part IVC applies
only if an MIP is "incapable of understanding the general nature and effect of a treatment", and
hence is unable to give valid consent. See Liu, "Consent to medical treatment by or for a mentally
incapacitated adult: the Hong Kong common law and Part IVC of the Mental Health Ordinance"
1 Asian Journal of Gerontology & Geriatrics (2006) 31.
(2007) HKLJ
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4. Expanding the Definition of an MIP in the Mental Health Ordinance
The Report, therefore, recommends that the definition of a MIP be ex-
panded to cover a person in a coma or vegetative state. Recommendation
10 states:
"the definition of 'mentally incapacitated person' ... should be amended
along the following lines:
(1) ... a mentally incapacitated person is a person who is at the material
time -
(a) unable by reason of mental disability to make a decision for
himself on the matter in question; or
(b) unable to communicate his decision on that matter because he
is unconscious or for any other reason.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is at the material time
unable by reason of mental disability to make a decision if, at the
time when the decision needs to be made, he is -
(a) unable to understand or retain the information relevant to the
decision, including information about the reasonably foresee-
able consequences of deciding one way or another or of failing
to make the decision; or
(b) unable to make a decision based on that information.
(3) In subsection (1), 'mental disability' means -
(a) mental illness;
(b) a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which
amounts to a significant impairment of intelligence and social
functioning which is associated with abnormally aggressive or
seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person con-
cerned;
(c) psychopathic disorder;
(d) mental handicap; or
(e) any other disability or disorder of the mind or brain, whether
permanent or temporary, which results in an impairment or dis-
turbance of mental functioning.
(4) A person shall not be regarded as unable to understand the informa-
tion referred to in subsection (2)(a) if he is able to understand an
explanation of that information in broad terms and in simple lan-
guage.
Vol 3 7 Part 3
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(5) A person shall not be regarded as unable by reason of mental dis-
ability to make a decision only because he makes a decision which
would not have been made by a person of ordinary prudence.
(6) A person shall not be regarded as unable to communicate his deci-
sion unless all practicable steps to enable him to do so have been
taken without success."
Readers will note that this expanded definition covers not only those who
are mentally ill and handicapped (as is the case with the current defini-
tion); it also covers any adult who is unable to make a decision by reasons
of mental disability or who is unable to communicate a decision. This ef-
fectively covers not only the demented, stroke patients and brain injured
patients, but also those who are in a coma or vegetative state. Such a defini-
tion would assist those in need; however, what should have been made clear
by the Report is that this recommendation covers many more patients than
those who are in a coma or vegetative state.
5. Conclusion
Statistics on the elderly population are outlined early in the Report; sta-
tistics that portray a picture in which many demented elderly persons will
lack the capacity at one time or another to make decisions. This may be
misleading if the focus of the Report is only concerned with those in a
coma or vegetative state. Yet, as discussed above in Part 4 of this paper, its
recommendation in fact applies to all who are unable by reasons of mental
disability to make decisions, or to communicate a decision. Even if one
confines the Report's recommendation to those who are in a coma or veg-
etative state, the recommendation does not explore a potential conflict
between proxy decision making under the MHO and the common law. As
the author has already discussed this issue in another paper, it will not be
elaborated upon here.'
Another problem with the recommendation, if implemented, is that
the MHO may be overworked. This is because it will cover not only adults
lacking capacity (such as the demented elderly, stroke victims and those
who are comatose or in a vegetative state) on the one hand, but also those
who are mentally ill and handicapped, on the other hand. These two groups
1 Liu, "Consent to medical treatment for and by a mentally incapacitated adult: the interplay be-
tween the Hong Kong common law and Part IVC of the Mental Health Ordinance (MHO)", Law
Lectures for Practitioners (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005).
(2007) HKLJ
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share one common characteristic: they need long-term care and guardian-
ship. The Report's recommendation effectively brings them all under the
MHO.
To avoid overworking the MHO with complex categories of vulner-
able people, it is submitted that it may be preferable to deal with these two
groups of patients in separate ordinances. 5 Thus, those who are mentally ill
or handicapped (currently governed by the MHO), requiring compulsory
treatment and confinement to prevent them from harming themselves and
others, would continue to be governed by the MHO. However patients who
are not likely to cause danger to themselves and others, but merely require
care and attention, should be covered by a new Adult Guardianship Ordi-
nance (as opposed to the existing Guardianship of Minors Ordinance).
As regards the elderly population, many of whom may suffer from de-
mentia, the legal issues arising from medical decision making, or decision
making generally, require further examination. It is submitted that the Law
Reform Commission should, despite the work of the Elderly Commission, 36
examine the adequacy of existing legal protection. Currently, most of the
elderly are cared for by their relatives, at hostels, care and attention homes
or infirmaries depending on their needs, and the majority are without any
guardianship order.3 ' Those working in care institutions know, it is com-
mon practice that many elderly are tied to their chairs (by restrainers), and
some care workers believe that they are authorised to use such restrainers
because the patients' relatives have signed a consent form. A newspaper
recently reported 8 that some of these care establishments routinely deduct
all social welfare money from their elderly resident-clients, leaving them
with no day-to-day pocket money, while other elderly people are victims of
both physical and financial abuse. 39 All these raise questions beyond medi-
cal decision making and highlight elderly dependency and their need for
legal protection. The Hong Kong Law Reform Commission should examine
these issues as a matter of urgency.
As regards mental health law, the MHO is also due for a thorough re-
view. This is so because the MHO was enacted in 1960, and since then it
has been amended, on an ad hoc basis, more than 20 times. One review
3 However, the distinction between mental health issues and non-mental health issues may not
always be clear in some cases. See, eg, B v Croydon District Health Authority [1994] 22 BMLR 13;
Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH [1996] 1 FLR 762. See also Bartlett and Sandland,
Mental Health Law: Policy and Practice (London: Blackstone Press Limited, 2000), pp 220-223.
Report of the Elderly Commission 1997-1999. (http://www.elderlycommission.gov.hk/en/library/
ECREPORT.HTM) (accessed on 17 Nov 2006).
See The Guardianship Board First Report 1999-2001, for the numbers of orders made at p 3 3 . See also
The Guardianship Board Second Report 2003-2006.
3 Ming Pao, 7 Nov 2005.
39 Sing Pao, 12 June 2006; Re Madam L [2004] HKEC 1269.
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agenda would be to consider whether the admission of a demented person
for treatment under the MHO complies with the existing human rights pro-
visions in Hong Kong.40
40 'Bournewood' Consultation: the approach to be taken in response to the judgment of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in the 'Bournewood' case", DoH, March 2005; "Bournewood Briefing
Sheet", DoH, June 2006 (http://www.dh.gov.uk/PublicationsAndStatistics).
(2007) HKLJ
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